EgyptAir 990

Boeing 767-300ER SU-GAP, 31 October 1999. Replay of the NTSB flight and cockpit voice recorder data.

01:49:40.00
EST
Captain's seat. Click to enlarge

Drag to turn. Bright line: true horizon; faint lines every 10°. Left surfaces orange, right cyan.

MASTER WARNINGCaptain MASTER WARNINGFirst officer MASTER CAUTIONfrom CVR beeper AUTOPILOT CMDcenter AUTOTHROTTLETMC engaged ENG OIL PRESSleft low ENG OIL PRESSright low ENG FIREleft ENG FIREright
Airspeed, kt (computed)
Pitch and bank
Altitude, ft (uncorrected)
Heading (magnetic)
Engines
Control surfaces, °
Levers

About the data

217 people were aboard: 203 passengers, 10 flight attendants and 4 flight crew. There were no survivors.

The NTSB determined the probable cause to be "the airplane's departure from normal cruise flight and subsequent impact with the Atlantic Ocean as a result of the relief first officer's flight control inputs," adding that "the reason for the relief first officer's actions was not determined." Egypt's Civil Aviation Authority disputed this in its response to the draft report (Attachment B of the final report): it pointed to sheared and deformed rivets in the elevator bellcrank system as evidence of a possible elevator malfunction, and argued that shock waves near Mach 1 could explain the split between the elevators, rather than opposing inputs from the pilots. This replay shows the recorded data and does not decide between them.

What drives the replay

95 one-second rows from the NTSB FDR tables, 01:49:01.98 to 01:50:35.98 EST, shown from 01:49:40. Values are interpolated between rows for smooth motion. The recorder samples each parameter at its own point within a second, and the tables don't preserve that timing. The last pose is held 0.66 s to the recorder cutoff at 01:50:36.64, then the aircraft is hidden.

Elevators and ailerons turn on their hinge lines by the recorded angles, trailing edge up positive (FDR factual report, docket item 99, pp.3–5). The rudder's sign is given only by a Boeing plot label, so it is shown as a number and not animated. Only the speedbrake handle is recorded, not spoiler panel angles, so the spoiler panels stay down. Engine shutdown produced spikes that the FDR report calls erroneous; they are shown as printed and marked.

Aural alerts are synthesized in the browser from the cockpit voice recorder transcript (final report PDF pp.112–114): four tones similar to the master caution beeper at 01:49:58.78 and 01:50:19.51, and a repeating hi-low tone similar to the master warning from 01:50:08.20 to the end of the recording at 01:50:38.47 (identified by the investigation as the overspeed warning). They are not the recorded audio; pitch and rhythm are approximations. The transcript records no autopilot-disconnect warning; a simulator autopilot-disengage sample is played at 01:49:44.98, the first FDR row with the autopilot disengaged, and labelled as not on the recording.

The replay starts at 01:39:56, when the relief first officer enters the cockpit. Flight data for 01:39:50.98–01:49:00.98 come from the same NTSB tables (summary pp.14–69, engine pp.81–88, slats pp.126–140), parsed by word position and cross-checked against an independent parse. Guided playback runs in real time through the cockpit conversation (01:39:56–01:40:52), the captain leaving the cockpit (01:48:00–01:48:52) and the final sequence (01:49:38 to the end of the cockpit recording), and fast-forwards between them.

Speakers: CAM-1a is Captain Ahmed El-Habashy, CAM-2a/HOT-2a is First Officer Adel Anwar, and CAM-2b is Relief First Officer Gameel El-Batouty. The roles follow the final report; the names follow the forms of address in the transcript ("Captain Habashi", "Jimmy"/"Gamil", "Adel") and the published crew list. Other voices are not identified in the transcript.

Subtitles are the NTSB's English translation of the cockpit voice recorder (final report PDF pp.95–114); for the final lines the Arabic is shown as written in the NTSB Arabic transcript (docket item 112). Alert lights come from the FDR's recorded discretes (master warning, autopilot, autothrottle, engine low oil pressure, engine fire); the master caution light is not recorded and is lit only while the CVR records the caution beeper.

Documentary audio from the local copy of the Al Jazeera documentary (../cockpit-audio/): the opening takeoff sequence plays as a prologue (an edited montage, 01:19:43 to 01:26:47), followed by the 01:30:07 drink order as text only. During the dive, the documentary's cockpit excerpt (its 34:22–34:28; Whisper hears the captain's “shut the engines” and “pull with me”) plays with its first “shut the engines” on the CVR time 01:50:28.85. Two other stretches cut earlier turned out to be a controller interview and music, so they are not used.

Weather (NTSB Meteorology Group Factual Report, docket item 25): night; satellite imagery at 0645Z showed a band of mid- and low-level cloud over the accident area with tops near 19,000 ft, no convective cloud, no weather-radar returns and no pilot reports of significant weather. Nantucket at 0653Z: wind 170° at 9 kt, visibility 9 miles, clear below 12,000 ft, 12.8 °C. The wind and temperature readout follows the aircraft's altitude through the Chatham, MA 00Z sounding (about 83 nm north). The cloud band is drawn between 12,000 ft (the base is not reported; Nantucket was clear below that) and 19,000 ft, with broken coverage; its exact extent is approximate.

Altitude is uncorrected pressure altitude. Airspeed is recorded computed airspeed, not ground speed. Thrust lever angles are resolver angles, not thrust.

What the evidence cannot show

No attitude or control positions exist after 01:50:36.64. The climb to about 25,000 ft, the second descent and the impact about 01:52:30 come from radar estimates with large uncertainty; the timeline strip joins three of them with straight dashed lines. This is an attitude replay, not a physics simulation or a flight path, and it does not establish a cause.

The 3-D aircraft is a Boeing 767-300 model. The landing gear is removed because it was up. The approximate 1999 livery uses red and gold bands and the historical Horus tail badge; the recorded aircraft was SU-GAP. Model notice and licence

Earlier flight: departure from JFK about 01:20; cleared to FL330 and DOVEY at 01:35:52; level at FL330 at 01:44:27 (final report, PDF pp.8–9).

Livery

Use a PNG with a transparent background. It is saved in this browser and drawn on both sides of the tail.
Docket index FDR tables Final report event sequence Boeing dimensions Timeline CSV

Source times: NTSB radar-correlated EST. Recorded measurements, investigation estimates and documentary claims are kept separate.